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This paper first utilizes annual surveys between the 1981 and 2000 waves of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth to estimate the effect of being overweight on hourly 
wages.  Previous studies have shown that white women are the only race-gender group 
for which weight has a statistically significant effect on wages.  This paper finds a 
statistically significant continual increase in the wage penalty for overweight and obese 
white women followed throughout two decades.  A supporting analysis from a cross-
sectional dataset, comprised of the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey and the 
2000 and 2004 waves of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, also shows an increasing 
wage penalty.  The bias against weight has increased, despite drastic increases in the rate 
of obesity in the United States.  Alternatively, the increasing rarity of thinness has led to 





* Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts 
(Economics), Hunter College, The City University of New York.   1
I. Introduction 
     Obesity has become a serious public health concern in the United States.  Besides the 
obvious personal health consequences associated with being overweight, there are costs 
to society in terms of increased medical expenditures and loss of productivity.   Like race 
and gender, weight is another factor that leads to discrimination.  Rebecca Puhl of the 
Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity at Yale University states, “The stigma of 
obesity has actually worsened in the past 40 years with the increase in prevalence of 
obesity.  The bias [has become] more socially acceptable.
1”  Although almost everyone 
has more contact with the stigmatized group, the stigma is growing along with the 
national waistline.   
     Obesity is a relevant issue in labor economics.  A large body of economic literature 
explores how race and gender have impacted wages of women and minorities throughout 
the history of the United States.  In a similar vein, our culture promotes and rewards 
thinness and beauty, providing consequences for being overweight.  Since the rate of 
obesity has increased dramatically in the United States, researchers have studied the 
economic consequences of weight for at least 15 years.  Studies have shown statistically 
significant penalties from weight on wages.  This paper explores how the wage penalty 
from weight has changed between 1981 and 2004.  We might expect a declining penalty 
due to the increase in the percentage of overweight individuals.  On the other hand, 
increasing awareness of and bias against weight may have increased the penalty over 
time. 
                                                 
1 Personal Interview.  Tatiana Andreyeva, Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity,  
   Yale University, November 2006.   2
     Body Mass Index (BMI) is a measure of a person’s body weight, scaled according to 
height.   Defined as weight (kg) divided by the square of height (m)
2, it has been 
criticized for its inability to distinguish between muscle and fat.  Regardless, researchers 
use this measure of body mass to determine weight status.  A BMI reading over 25 
classifies the person as overweight, and a reading over 30 signifies obesity.  A reading 
over 40 classifies the person as morbidly obese.  More than 64 percent of American 
adults were overweight or obese in the 1999-2000 National Health and Nutrition Survey 
(NHANES) (Flegal, 2002).  This represents a 36 percent increase from NHANES II 
(1976-1980), when the rate was 47 percent.  Approximately 59 million adults, or 31 
percent, were considered obese in 2000, having increased from 15 percent in the earlier 
NHANES sample.  
     The effect of obesity on wages is of specific interest to economists.  Obesity is a 
discriminatory factor in hiring and promotions.  The growing literature already shows a 
statistically significant penalty from higher weight on wages.  Since the rate of obesity 
has increased in the United States, it is important to understand not only the level of the 
wage penalty, but also how the penalty has changed.  While the population of “normal” 
weight people has declined, the awareness and stigma of weight seem to have increased.  
This paper utilizes econometric models to show how the wage penalty has changed 
throughout twenty years of data.  Section II includes a review of economic literature.  
Section III discusses datasets.  Section IV explains econometric models, analysis, and 
results.  Section V concludes, with suggestions for further research on the changing 
mechanisms through which weight has affected wage levels. 
                                                 
2 Equivalently, it is calculated as 703*weight (lb) / height
2 (in).    3
II. Literature Review 
     The economics literature studying the economic effects of being overweight or obese 
has grown over the past 15 years.  One primary issue is whether or not, and the extent to 
which, increasing weight affects wages.  Register and Williams (1990) study the effect of 
obesity on wage rates with a sample of roughly 8000 men and women between the ages 
of 18 and 25, from the 1982 round of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY).  Controlling for the link between physical appearance and occupational choice, 
their results show a significant 12 percent penalty for obese women, but no significant 
penalty for obese men.  The authors note the need to repeat the analysis for an older 
sample, since many 18- to 25- year old individuals are in school, and therefore have 
highly variable wages.   
     Loh (1993) continues this research with analyses of wage levels of full-time workers 
in the 1982 NLSY and wage changes between 1982 and 1985.  He finds no significant 
effects in 1982 for either males or females.  However, wages grew roughly 5 percent less 
between the two rounds for obese men and women.  Concerns remained regarding the 
endogeneity of weight.  Weight may very well be correlated with unobserved factors in 
the error term of the wage equation, causing bias.  For instance, wage model covariates 
do not include a measure of the rate of time discount.  If obese individuals discount future 
outcomes more steeply, they are less likely to invest in health and human capital since the 
current value of future outcomes is smaller.  If there is less investment in human capital, 
wages are lower (Burkhauser, 2004). 
          Averett and Korenman (1996) use a sample of respondents ages 23 to 31 (5090 
women, 4951 men) from the 1988 wave of the NLSY to study the effects of BMI on   4
income, marital status, and hourly pay differentials.  To control for the endogeneity of 
weight, Averett and Korenman utilize 1981 BMI in their first model.   They show a 
statistically significant 15 percent penalty on hourly wages for women with a BMI 
greater than or equal to 30.   Using 1988 BMI, they find a 10 percent penalty on wages.  
For men, there is an 8 percent penalty using 1981 BMI, and a 3 percent penalty using 
1988 BMI.  The primary discrimination, however, results from the marriage market, as 
both the probability of being married and spouse’s earnings account for a large portion of 
the difference in economic status.  Further, the authors estimate models including an 
interaction between obesity in 1981 and 1988.  Women who became obese between 1981 
and 1988 seem to be no worse off than women of recommended weight, while those who 
were obese at younger ages face significant wage penalties.  
     Pagan and Davila (1997) estimate cross-sectional wage models similar to those of 
Averett and Korenman, using 1989 NLSY data.  First, the authors run a multinominal 
logit model to compare the occupational distribution of the obese and the non-obese, 
separated by gender.  They find that obese men choose jobs where they have a 
productivity advantage over the non-obese, or where they receive a premium for 
undertaking risks.  Men face low barriers when moving across occupations, and are more 
likely to work in repair, transportation, and manufacturing industries.  The authors then 
utilize an instrumental variables (IV) approach, first regressing BMI on exogenous 
variables (health limitations, “self esteem” dummy variables, family poverty level in 
1988, education, experience, race, ethnic group, marital status, school enrollment, region, 
and occupation).  They find that the net effect of obesity on the earnings of men is 
slightly positive.  Larger women, confined to low-level service sector and clerical   5
occupations, face wage penalties of at least 10 percent.  The set of instruments are, 
however, directly related to the dependent variable.  Furthermore, health limitations and 
“self esteem” variables could be related to the rate of time discount, found in the error 
term of the wage equation. 
     Since the literature up to this point shows significant wage penalties for larger women, 
questions appeared regarding the mechanisms through which weight affects wages.   
Discrimination could be based upon stereotypes of larger people, specifically that they 
lack self-discipline, and are lazy, less conscientious, and slower.  Further, employers 
might be paying lower wages due to the higher costs of insuring obese and overweight 
individuals.  A few papers, with conflicting results, address this possibility.  Baum and 
Ford (2004) explore the mechanisms by which obese workers earn lower wages, 
proposing several possibilities, using data from the 12 years between 1981 through 1998 
NLSY rounds in which weight and height were requested.  
          Individual models estimate a statistically significant 6 percent wage penalty from 
obesity for women, and a 3 percent penalty for men.  Individual difference models 
estimate a 2.3 percent penalty for women, and a 0.7 percent penalty for men.  By 
including a term interacting obesity and health insurance dummy variables, they show 
that there is actually less of a wage penalty when employers provide health insurance.  In 
the individual difference models, obese men obtain a 4.7 percent increase in their pay, 
while women obtain a 2.7 percent increase.  Finally, they show that workers in customer-
oriented occupations earn less, but do not face a larger wage penalty for being obese. 
     Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2005) estimate a model in which they compare the wage 
penalty for obesity using two separate cohorts, those with health insurance and those   6
without health insurance.  Using 1989-1999 NLSY data, they provide evidence that the 
obese pay for higher expected medical expenditures through lower wages, contrary to the 
findings of Baum and Ford (2004).  The authors show that obese people with health 
coverage were paid $1.70 per hour less than the insured non-obese throughout the entire 
period.  The difference in wages between non-insured obese and non-obese people was 
only $0.40.  Therefore, the insured obese indirectly pay for higher expected medical 
expenditures through lower wages.  While the results contrast with those of Baum and 
Ford (2004), note that these authors did not take unobserved heterogeneity and 
endogeneity of weight into account when specifying their models.  Further, neither Baum 
and Ford nor Bhattacharya and Bundorf explore the effect of being overweight, but not 
obese, on wages. 
     Cawley (2004) utilizes 1981-2000 NLSY data from the years in which weight and 
height are included.  He obtains estimates of true weight and height in the NLSY data by 
utilizing coefficients reported in NHANES III, which includes self-reported numbers and 
actual values taken from physical examinations.  Separately by race-gender groups, 
actual weight is regressed on reported weight and its square.  Judging by the high R-
squared of .995, reported weight and its square are strong predictors of actual weight.  
The same process was repeated for height, leading to similarly significant results.  In 
NHANES III, self reported height and weight of NLSY-aged white females result in 
underestimated BMI by an average of 1.58 percent, while male calculated BMI is 
underestimated by an average of 1.0 percent.  Finally, self-reports of both weight and 
height in the NLSY are multiplied by the coefficients reported in NHANES III according 
to race-gender group.  In his wage models, Cawley finds statistically significant results   7
for women, though substantially less for black and Hispanic women.  For white women, 
the coefficient on BMI is -0.008, and the coefficient on weight in pounds is -0.0014.  For 
a two standard deviation increase in weight (64 lbs.), white women are paid 9 percent 
less.  Black men seem to receive higher wages with higher weight, and Hispanic men 
incur a wage penalty.   
     Due to the endogeneity of weight, Cawley turns to IV, attempting to find a set of 
instruments that are correlated with BMI, but uncorrelated with the error term in the wage 
equation.  The first instrument discussed is sibling BMI, which is highly correlated with 
respondent BMI.  Further, he assumes that sibling BMI is uncorrelated with the 
respondent’s wage residual.  To control for the age and gender of the sibling, the author 
also includes these variables in the set of instruments.  The instruments are good 
predictors of a woman’s weight.  For white females, the first stage regression shows a t-
statistic of 23.47.  However, it is impossible to prove that sibling BMI is uncorrelated 
with the residual in the wage equation.  The respondent’s rate of time discount is included 
in the residual.  If this rate of discount is influenced by the family, then the sibling’s BMI 
is also correlated with it.  This paper will focus on associations between BMI and wages, 
rather than causal effects, due to the difficulty involved in determining an appropriate 
instrument. 
     Results show that BMI and weight in pounds have statistically significant effects on 
wages at the 5 percent level for white females only.  The coefficient on BMI is -0.0017, 
and the coefficient on weight in pounds is -0.0028.  These coefficients are, in absolute 
value, twice as large as those found in the earlier OLS models.  Here, a two standard 
deviation increase in weight is associated with an 18 percent decline in wages.  White and   8
Hispanic males’ BMI has an effect on wages significant at the 9 percent level.  Results 
for all other race-gender groups are insignificant, including black and Hispanic females.  
Averett and Korenman (1999) explain that increased weight has a stronger negative 
impact on the self-esteem of white females.          
     Although researchers have reported the negative effect of weight on wages, few have 
examined how the effect changes over time.  As a continually increasing proportion of 
the population becomes classified as overweight, the question arises.  Since significant 
effects are found mostly for white females, this paper’s focus is on the changing penalty 
from weight on wages for that group.  Surveys do not have sufficient observations on 
non-whites to find such differences.  Our conclusions will be specific to white female 
observations in our datasets. 
 
III. Data 
     This paper utilizes two datasets, one panel and one cross-sectional, to explore the 
changing penalty from weight on wages.  The panel dataset allows year-by-year 
comparisons among a cohort of women who are in their youth at the beginning of the 
sample.  The cross-sectional dataset captures a broader representation of society, since 
each year of data contains a much wider age range than the panel.  Further, this dataset is 
uncomplicated by group composition effects.  In the panel, the cohort of women who 
grow older could have characteristics specific to their group that affect wages. 
III.I National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
     The first dataset utilized in this paper is taken from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth (NLSY), as cleaned and specified by Cawley (2004).  This panel survey, 
conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, began with   9
annual interviews of 12,686 young males and females in 1979.  Since 1994, interviews 
have been conducted every other year.  The NLSY simplifies race categories into three 
groups, black, Hispanic, and non-black/non-Hispanic (referred to as white in the 
literature).  The NLSY includes self-reported weight in 13 years included in our sample, 
1981, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000.  
Height was reported in 1981, 1982, and 1985; height in 1985 is used in our models.  The 
dataset includes pooled data from these 13 years, spanning two decades.  
     As  described  above  in  Literature  Review, self-reports of weight and height are 
adjusted according to race-gender specific coefficients determined by regression in the 
NHANES III.  Females who are pregnant when they report weight are dropped from the 
sample.  Wages for all years are adjusted to 1990 dollars according to the CPI – All 
Urban Consumers series.  Outliers in the wage variable are recoded such that the wage 
range is $1 to $500, since the dependent variable is the natural log wage. 
     OLS models with white females rely on 25,843 observations ranging from ages 16 to 
43.  Models are estimated on the sample of working women.  Figure 1 shows the 
dramatic increases in rates of being overweight and obese in white females from 1981 to 
2000.  See Table 1 for summary statistics. 
III.II National Medical Expenditure Survey / Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
     The second dataset utilized in this paper is a pooled cross-sectional dataset made of 
the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) and the 2000 and 2004 waves of 
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).  The NMES, conducted by the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services (Agency for Health Care Policy and 
Research), is a three-part national survey of the U.S. population.  It includes questions on   10
health care services utilized, demographic variables, and personal health characteristics.  
Data is made available for member institutions of the Interuniversity Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan.  The Household 
Survey includes 38,846 individuals; 30,038 of these individuals are also included in the 
Health Status Questionnaire and Access to Care Supplement.  The Household Survey 
contains all variables utilized in analysis here, with the exception of body height and 
weight, found in the health supplement. 
     Efforts  to  publish  data  on  medical  expenditures were continued with the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which began in 1996.  The MEPS, conducted by the 
United States Department of Health & Human Services (Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality), is a set of large-scale surveys of families and individuals, their medical 
providers, and employers.  There are two major components, the Household Component 
and the Insurance Component.  The MEPS has demographic and body characteristics 
data similar to the NMES.  The survey is called a panel because questions are asked of 
respondents in numerous rounds.  However, there is a new set of respondents every two 
years.  This paper utilizes data from the 2000 and 2004 MEPS since the previous MEPS 
samples do not include measures of weight and height.   
     Again,  self-reports  of  weight  and  height are adjusted according to race-gender 
coefficients determined by regression in the NHANES III, as described above in 
Literature Review.  Wages for all years are adjusted to 2004 dollars according to the CPI 
– All Urban Consumers series.  Outliers in the wage variable are recoded such that the 
wage range is $1 to $65.63
3.  OLS models with employed white females rely on 11,899 
                                                 
3 The maximum wage reported in NLSY is $500, whereas the maximum wage reported in MEPS is $65.63.     11
observations, ranging from ages 16 to 64.  See Table 2 for summary statistics of white 
females in the OLS dataset.  Average BMI increases from 24.33 in 1987 to 26.97 in 2000.  
It further increases to 27.33 in 2004.  Similarly, average BMI increases 23.53 in 1998 to 
26.80 in 2000 in the NLSY sample. 
 
IV. Econometric Methods and Analysis  
IV.I Econometric Model 
     Based on previous studies of the effects of obesity on wages, this paper focuses on 
white women.  Cawley’s results present a convincing case that BMI has statistically 
significant effects on wages, but for white women only.  Studies propose that larger white 
women have self-esteem problems not experienced by other race-gender groups, which 
could influence their ability to advocate for higher wages.  As seen in Figure 1, the cohort 
becomes increasingly overweight and obese throughout two decades.  Studies have 
described the effects of race and gender on wages, and how the effects have changed over 
time.  This paper introduces analysis exploring how the effect of weight on wages has 
changed for white women.   
     All models utilizing NLSY data have robust standard errors, clustered to account for 
the fact that the individuals are in the sample more than once.  Wages are bottom coded at 
$1.00 since our dependent variable is the natural log.  Further, all models are limited to 
the sample of working white women who report positive wages.  Previous literature has 
provided evidence that BMI has a negative effect on wages.  The probability of being 
employed could decline with increased BMI because of the disincentive to work that is 
associated with the lower wages.  If this is the case, then we will underestimate the effect 
of weight on wages; overweight women who are discouraged to work are excluded from   12
our models.  The effective wage of these discouraged workers is zero.  The goal is to 
explore how the weight penalty has changed over time.  If the effect of BMI on 
participation has increased or decreased, the disincentive to work could also affect the 
time trend we seek to capture.   
     Starting with the baseline model, variations are added to explore the year-by-year 
changing effect of BMI on the log wage.   
(1) ln Wit = BMIit β + Xit γ + εit 
The dependent variable is the natural log of the hourly wage.  BMI is the body weight 
status measurement.   The set of control variables includes linear measures of age and 
time.  The NLSY includes the age of the woman’s youngest child, and the total number 
of children to whom she has given birth.  Additional control variables include general 
intelligence (derived from ten Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery tests), highest 
grade completed, mother’s highest grade completed, father’s highest grade completed, 
years of actual work experience, job tenure, an indicator variable for white collar or blue 
collar work, current school enrollment, county unemployment rate, a part-time work 
dummy variable, marital status indicators, region of residence, and finally, dummy 
variables for missing data associated with each regressor (except weight).  The 
NMES/MEPS includes the total number of children living in the household.  Additional 
control variables include highest grade completed, marital status indicators, and 
geographic region of residence.  
     The model described in equation (1) assumes a constant BMI effect over time.  In 
order to capture potential changes in the BMI effect, the following model is estimated. 
(2) ln Wit = BMIitβ + YRNtδ + YRNt*BMIitλ + Xit γ + εit   13
The variable YRN is defined as Year less 1981 (NLSY) or 1987 (NMES/MEPS).  The 
variable YRN*BMI captures the changing effect of BMI on wages. 
     Prior  to  estimating  the  restrictive model for the NLSY, a more general dummy 
variable model was attempted.  Instead of having the YRNt*BMIit variable, there was a 
set of dummy variables for the each of the years (excluding 1981), and a set of terms 
interacting the year dummy variables with BMI.  This model is more general than the 
restrictive model, since it allows the effect of BMI on the wage to vary completely over 
time.  None of the Year*BMI interaction variables had a statistically significant effect on 
log wage (results not shown).  Additionally, the coefficient on BMI was not significant.  
Therefore, we return to the results from the more parsimonious model. 
IV.II Results from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
     The coefficient on YRNt*BMIit is an estimate of the linear trend of the effect of BMI 
on wages since 1981.  Results are in Table 3.  The coefficient on BMI is -0.00577, and is 
significant at the 1 percent level.  The coefficient on YRNt*BMIit is -0.00023, and it is 
significant at the 10 percent level.  This suggests that when holding all other factors 
constant, the penalty from higher BMI grows throughout two decades of data.  First by 
multiplying the coefficient on YRNt*Bit by the values of YRNt, we obtain the year-by-
year differing penalty from BMI on wage.  We add these values to the initial effect, the 
coefficient on BMI, to obtain the year-by-year penalties from a one-point increase in BMI 
on log wage.    
     Comparisons in this paper will be made between the 25
th and 75
th percentiles for BMI 
of white women, or roughly one standard deviation.  Keeping all other variables constant 
at their mean values, we will simulate the percentage wage penalty incurred by going   14
from the lower quartile to the upper quartile.  Shen (2006) lists the 25
th and 75
th 
percentiles for BMI at 21.0 and 28.4, a difference of 7.4 points.  For a 5’4” woman (64 
in.), these BMI values correspond to weights of 122.36 lbs. and 165.47 lbs.  The penalty 
for being at the 75
th percentile, rather than the 25
th percentile, grows from 4.29 percent in 
1981 to 7.47 percent in 2000 (Figure 2).  This analysis shows that the weight penalty 
almost doubles over a period during which weight stigma increased. 
IV.III Results from the National Medical Expenditure Survey / Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey 
 
IV.III.I Baseline Model 
 
     Section IV.II includes models run on a panel dataset.  Results would lead us to think 
that the wage penalty for being overweight has increased over time due to increased 
weight stigmatization.  However, the first set of analyses involved the same women being 
followed for twenty years.  While the coefficient under examination is that on Year*BMI, 
and we find significant results, it could be that these effects result from a group 
composition effect.  That is, the panel of women could show an increasing wage penalty 
due at least partially to the effects of increasing age within the group, and cumulative 
discrimination over many years.  Supporting analyses from a cross-sectional dataset will 
help determine whether the negative, significant coefficient on BMI*Year is strictly from 
a group composition effect, or if it is indicative of what has happened in society at large.  
Therefore, it provides a clearer indication of the average penalty from weight on wage.  
While 2000 data from the NLSY includes women roughly 40 years of age, the 2000 
MEPS data captures the entire age spectrum.  Our next step is to utilize the NMES/MEPS 
data, and see how results compare to the NLSY results.  As stated above, this second 
analysis uses data from 1987, 2000 and 2004.     15
     The coefficient on BMI is -0.00489, and is significant at the 1 percent level (Table 4).  
The coefficient on YRNt*BMIit is not significant, suggesting that the effect of BMI on the 
wage has not changed over time.  Averett and Korenman (1996) found that women who 
became obese between 1981 and 1988 were no worse off than women of recommended 
weight, while those who were obese at younger ages face significant wage penalties.  
Unlike that study, we find in the cross-sectional data that all white women face some 
wage penalty from weight.   
IV.III.II Synthetic Cohort Models 
     The NLSY dataset specified by Cawley begins with respondents between the ages of 
16 and 24 in 1981.  The NLSY models in this paper study white women’s changing wage 
penalties from being overweight between 1981 and 2000.  It is found that penalties 
increase over time, presumably due to an increase in weight stigmatization.   The initial 
NMES/MEPS results do not show the same significant time trend.  However, this dataset, 
unlike the NLSY, is a cross-section, so it better represents the average population.  For 
instance, the 2000 data includes the entire age spectrum, whereas in NLSY, the youngest 
respondents in 2000 are 35 (since they were 16 in 1981).   
     For a further comparison, we can construct a “synthetic cohort,” pretending that the 
NMES/MEPS dataset is a panel.  For instance, since 1981 data in NLSY includes ages 
16-24, 2000 data includes ages 35-43.  In NMES/MEPS, we can use ages 22-30 in 1987 
(since this pretend cohort was 16-24 in 1981), and therefore, ages 35-43 in 2000, and 39-
47 in 2004.  This synthetic cohort will allow us to make comparisons to the results from 
the NLSY panel data; we can follow the “same” women throughout a seventeen-year 
period.  Besides using the same ages as those in NLSY data, we can also utilize a broader   16
age range.  For instance, we can study women under the age of 60 in 2004.  Therefore, 
we use ages 16-42 in 1987, ages 29-55 in 2000, and then ages 33-59 in 2004.  By using 
these synthetic cohorts, we can study the changing effects of being overweight on wages.  
Further, we can compare our results with NLSY models, and see if they support the idea 
that the wage penalty has increased for women, or declined as the rate of obesity has 
increased.   
     Using the aforementioned equation (1), the first synthetic cohort model follows the 
NLSY ages.  Therefore, 1987 data is restricted to ages 22-30, 2000 data is restricted to 
ages 35-43, and 2004 data is restricted to ages 39-47.  The coefficient on YRNt*BMIit is 
insignificant (Table 5).  An alternative is to restrict 1987 data to ages 16-24, and 
therefore, 2000 data is restricted to ages 29-37, and 2004 data is restricted to ages 33-41 
(Table 6).  The coefficient on BMI is insignificant.  The coefficient on YRNt*BMIit is  
-0.00055, and it is significant at the 5 percent level.  Holding all other factors constant, 
the penalty from BMI grows throughout two decades of data.  By multiplying the 
coefficient on YRNt*BMIit by the values of YRNt, we obtain the year-by-year increase in 
wage penalty from a one-point increase in BMI.  Using the one standard deviation 
increase in BMI of 7.4 points, the interpretation shows that by 2004, compared to 1987, 
there is a 7.25 percent larger penalty (Figure 3). 
    The last synthetic cohort model uses a much wider age range.  Although 65 is the 
typical retirement age in the United States, 2004 observations are restricted to ages less 
than 60, since ages 60-65 can be considered a pre-retirement period.  Therefore, 1987 
data contains ages 16-42, 2000 data contains ages 29-55, and 2004 data contains ages 33-
59.  The coefficient on BMI is -0.00376, and is significant at the 5 percent level (Table   17
7).  The coefficient on YRNt*Bit is -0.00028, and is also significant at the 5 percent level.  
Holding all other factors constant, the penalty from BMI grows throughout two decades 
of data. First by multiplying the coefficient on YRNt*BMIit by the values of YRNt, we 
obtain the year-by-year differing penalty from BMI on wage.  We add these values to the 
initial effect, the coefficient on BMI.  Our final results are the year-by-year wage 
penalties from a one standard deviation increase in BMI of 7.4 points (Figure 4).  The 
penalty grows from 2.81 percent in 1987 to 6.29 percent in 2004.  This analysis shows 
that the weight penalty more than doubles as weight stigma increases. 
    Thus far, the NLSY and NMES/MEPS synthetic cohort models generally show an 
increasing penalty from BMI on the wage.  In the last synthetic cohort model, 
observations were restricted such that the maximum age in 2004 is 59.  As such, we do 
not obtain the explanatory benefits of a non-restricted dataset.  The final model uses an 
unrestricted dataset, however, dummy variables are created to represent those individuals 
not in the synthetic cohort.  Therefore, the baseline group in this model is the synthetic 
cohort.  By having an unrestricted dataset, but still delineating the differential effects of 
weight on wages between those in the cohort and those not in the cohort, there is an 
acknowledgement that the cohort could have unique group composition effects.  While 
the cohort shows an increasing penalty, it could be that those outside of this group have 
either a declining penalty or no clear penalty at all. 
(1) ln Wit = BMIitβ + YRNtδ + YRNt*BMIitλ + YNGχ + OLDϕ + YNG*BMIitφ  + 
OLD*BMIitη +Xit γ + εit 
 
     The dummy variables YNG and OLD specify whether the individual is younger or 
older than the synthetic cohort in the year of the observation.  The variables YNG*BMIit 
and OLD*BMIit are interactions between the YNG and OLD dummy variables and BMI.    18
The coefficient on BMI is -0.00439, and is significant at the 1 percent level (Table 8).  
The coefficient on YRNt*Bit  is -0.00021, and is significant at the 10 percent level.   
Holding all other factors constant, the penalty from BMI grows throughout two decades 
of data.  Our final results are the year-by-year penalties from a one standard deviation 
increase in BMI on log wage for those in the synthetic cohort (Figure 5).  The penalty 
grows from 3.26 percent in 1987 to 5.99 percent in 2004.  However, careful interpretation 
also shows an increasing penalty for those individuals who are older and younger than the 
cohort.  This analysis shows an increasing wage penalty beyond a composition effect.  
This seems to suggest that the average wage penalty in society has increased.  Put another 
way, thinness has an increasing premium.   
     Simulated hourly wages for the nine series can be found in Figure 6.  Average values 
are used for the control variables.  There are three groups, young, cohort, and thin, 
combined with two body types, a BMI of 21, and a BMI of 28.4.  For a height of 5’4”, 
these BMI values correspond to body weights of 122.36 and 165.47, respectively.  There 
are no values for the young group in 1987, since it does not exist in that year (the 
synthetic cohort includes the youngest age, 16).  For each group, there are increasing 
wage penalties.  For the younger group in 2000, a BMI of 28.4 is associated with a 
slightly higher wage than a BMI of 21.  However, in 2004, there is a $0.04 penalty 
associated with the BMI of 28.4.  For the synthetic cohort, the penalty grows from $0.36 
in 1987 to $0.64 in 2000, and then to $0.75 in 2004.  For the older group, the penalty 
grows from $0.08 in 1987 to $0.31 in 2000, and then to $0.40 in 2004.  In line with 
NLSY results, the NMES/MEPS models show that weight is associated with an   19
increasing wage penalty over time.  Again, this paper does not explore the underlying 
reasons for the increasing penalty, but rather, proves and acknowledges its significance. 
 
V. Conclusion 
     The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  estimate the changing wage penalties for being 
overweight and obese in the United States since the early 1980s, a period which has seen 
a dramatic increase in the rate of obesity.  Coincidentally, the stigma placed on larger 
people may have increased.  Previous literature has studied the effects of weight on the 
wage level for either single-year datasets, or data pooled from many years.  It is generally 
found that white women face significant wage penalties from weight, while other race-
gender groups face smaller or no effects.  Therefore, this paper focuses on white women.  
After verifying the negative impact of weight on wages, this paper steps forward by 
studying how the wage penalty from weight has changed.   
     We might expect that the penalty has declined, because as the population of “normal” 
weight individuals has declined, there would be less room for discrimination.  However, 
the bias against weight appears to have increased.  By utilizing two datasets, with 
multiple econometric specifications, this paper helps us understand that weight has had 
consistently increasing penalties on wages.  The samples are limited to employed women 
who report positive wages.  Therefore, the estimates do not include the effects of larger 
women who might have been discouraged from working by the lower wages they would 
have received. 
     First,  thirteen  years  of  data  from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth are 
pooled together for an analysis.  This dataset follows the same panel of respondents.  An 
OLS model shows that the total penalty from a one standard deviation increase in BMI   20
(7.4 points) increases from 4.29 percent in 1981 to 7.47 percent in 2000.  The wage 
penalty almost doubles as weight stigma increases. 
     It is important to remember that the panel data follows the same women for many 
years.  A cross-sectional dataset better captures the societal averages, since each survey 
year includes a new group of people.  The second dataset utilized in this paper is culled 
from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, and the 2000 and 2004 waves of 
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey.  The cross-sectional data captures the average 
effect over a wider age range.  Initial attempts suggest that the weight penalty on wages 
has not changed over time. 
     A synthetic cohort model is attempted with data restricted to ages 16-24 in 1987, ages 
29-37 in 2000, and ages 33-41 in 2004.  This model shows that by 2004, compared to 
1987, each one standard deviation increase in BMI is associated with a 7.25 percent 
larger penalty on the wage.  In the last synthetic cohort model, we utilize a wider age 
range such that the maximum age in 2004 is the pre-early retirement age of 59.  Data 
from 1987 includes ages 16-42, 2000 includes 29-55, and 2004 includes 33-59.  Using 
the OLS model, we find an increasing penalty as we found in NLSY.  The wage penalty 
from a one standard deviation in BMI increases from 2.81 percent in 1987 to 6.29 percent 
in 2004.   
     Finally, we utilize a model that has no restrictions on observations, but rather, uses 
dummy variables to signify observations that are younger and older than the synthetic 
cohort in the given year.  These dummy variables are interacted with BMI.  Both the 
dummy variables and interaction variables are included in the baseline OLS model.   
Therefore, the synthetic cohort becomes the baseline part of the model.  The penalty for a   21
one standard deviation in BMI grows from 3.26 percent in 1987 to 5.99 percent in 2004.  
Alternatively, the dollar value wage penalty for an observation with a BMI of 28.4, 
compared to the same observation with a BMI of 21, grows from $0.36 in 1987 to $0.64 
in 2000, and then to $0.75 in 2004.   Further, the wage penalty grows for individuals who 
are older and younger than those in the synthetic cohort.  We might have explained the 
NLSY results by saying that they could be partially affected by the composition effect of 
the group.  However, increasing penalties for younger and older observations suggest that 
the increasing penalty is not simply a composition effect. 
     The  increasing  wage  penalty  corresponds to current psychological research that 
demonstrates increased weight stigmatization in the United States.  Further, as larger 
women age, their wages incur the effects of years of cumulative discrimination.  With 
other factors controlled, their starting wages are lower.  Throughout their working 
careers, these women receive less frequent raises and promotions.  Therefore, we see 
increasing penalties in both NLSY data and the synthetic cohort constructed from 
NMES/MEPS data.  This paper has shown that an obese 43 year-old woman received a 
larger wage penalty in 2004 than she received at 20 in 1981.  This paper also provides 
some evidence that an obese 20 year-old woman receives a larger wage penalty today 
than she would have in 1981 at age 20.  Future literature should further explore this 
aspect of the story, as well as the mechanisms by which the wage disparities occur.  It can 
be concluded that increased body weight has drastic economic consequences that have 
grown over time.  Alternatively, the increasing rarity of thinness has created its growing 
wage premium.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in NLSY Analysis (Pooled Sample) 
Variable     N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Log Wage  25845  1.98 0.60  0  6.16 
Corrected BMI  25845  24.08 5.37 6.73 88.07 
Year*BMI 25845  214.39 162.67  0 1673.28 
Year   25845  8.54 5.63  0  19 
Corrected Weight  25845  143.32 33.61 42.60 572.13 
Year*Weight 25845  1276.57 975.86  0  10870.44 
Corrected Height  25845  64.65 2.27  51.03 80.74 
Year*Height 25845  552.28 365.03  0 1370.54 
Ever born    25845  0.99 1.16  0  10 
Young kid  25845  2.58 4.12  0  27 
No. Children in Household  25845  0.50 0.50  0  1 
White Collar  25845  0.59 0.49  0  1 
Missing White Collar  25845  0.09 0.29  0  1 
Mother's HGC  25845  11.37 3.31  0  20 
Missing Mother's HGC  25845  0.04 0.19  0  1 
Father's HGC  25845  11.19 4.47  0  20 
Missing Father's HGC  25845  0.07 0.26  0  1 
Married, Spouse Present  25845  0.53 0.50  0  1 
Married, Other  25845  0.15 0.36  0  1 
GCPS1 (Intelligence)  25845  0.09 0.93  -3.88  2.40 
Missing GCPS1  25845  0.03 0.17  0  1 
HGC   25845  13.14 2.40  0  20 
Missing HGC  25845  0.00 0.06  0  1 
Enrolled in School  25845  0.13 0.34  0  1 
Years of Work Experience  25845  7.24 5.33  0  23.7 
Missing Years of Work  25845  0.07 0.25  0  1 
Years at Current Job  25845  3.05 3.66  0 23.12 
Missing Years at Current Job  25845  0.01 0.10  0  1 
Part-time Work Indicator  25845  0.85 0.36  0  1 
Missing Part-Time Work   25845  0.04 0.20  0  1 
Age   25845  28.54 6.09  16  43 
Low Unemployment in County  25845  0.43 0.49  0  1 
High Unemployment in County  25845  0.20 0.40  0  1 
Missing Unemployment  25845  0.02 0.15  0  1 
Northeast   25845  0.19 0.39  0  1 
North-Central  25845  0.30 0.46  0  1 
South     25845  0.33 0.47  0  1 
Definitions:  Log Wage:  natural log of wage, recoded to $1 to $500.  Corrected BMI:  BMI adjusted with 
NHANES III coefficient.  Year*BMI: (year-1981)*Corrected BMI interaction variable. Year: (year-1981). 
Corrected Weight: weight adjusted with NHANES III coefficient.  Year*Weight: (year-1981)*Corrected 
Weight interaction variable. Corrected Height: height adjusted with NHANES III coefficients.  Year*Height: 
(year-1981)*Corrected Height interaction variable. Ever born:  number of children ever born. Young kid: 
age of youngest child. Children Indicator: Dummy variable indicating whether or not there are children. 
White Collar: Dummy variable indicating job status (white collar, blue collar). Missing White Collar:  
Dummy variable for observations with missing White Collar value. Mother’s HGC: Mother’s highest grade 
completed. Missing Mother’s HGC: Dummy variable for observations with missing Mother’s HGC value. 
Father’s HGC: Father’s highest grade completed. Missing Father’s HGC: Dummy variable for observations 
with missing Father’s HGC value. Married, Spouse Present: Indicator – married, spouse present. Married, 
Other: Indicator for been married, but not with spouse. GPCS1 (Intelligence): General Intelligence. 
Missing GCPS1: Dummy variable for observations with missing GPCS1. HGC: highest grade completed. 
Missing HGC: Dummy variable for observations with missing HGC value. Enrolled in School: Dummy 
variable for school enrollment value. Years of Work Experience: Years of actual work experience. Missing   24
Years of Work Experience: Dummy variable for observations with missing Years of Work Experience value. 
Tenure: Years at current job. Missing Tenure: Dummy variable for observations with missing tenure value. 
Part-Time Work Indicator: Indicator for part-time work (continued on next page). 
Missing Part-Time Work Indicator: Dummy variable for observations with missing Part-Time Work 
Indicator value. Age: Age in years (16-43). Low unemployment in county: Indicator for unemployment 
under 6% in county. High unemployment in county: Indicator for unemployment greater than or equal to 
9% in county. Missing Unemployment: Dummy variable for observations with missing unemployment 
data.  Northeast: Indicator for Northeast region.  North-Central:  Indicator for North Central region.  
South:  Indicator for South Region.  Year Dummy: dummy variables for years 1982-2000. Year Dummy * 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in NMES/MEPS Analysis (Pooled Sample) 
Variable     N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Log Wage    11899  2.45 0.60  0  4.18 
Corrected BMI  11899  26.21 6.38  12.17  195.95 
Year*Corrected BMI  11899  270.01 220.60  0 2547.39 
Year   11899  9.92 7.51  0  17 
Test   11899  0.21 0.41  0  1 
Test 2    11899  0.25 0.44  0  1 
Test 5    11899  0.66 0.47  0  1 
Test 5 Young  11899  0.19 0.39  0  1 
Test 5 Old    11899  0.15 0.36  0  1 
Test5Young*Corrected BMI  11899  4.89 10.57  0 195.95 
Test 5 Old * Corrected BMI  11899  3.99 9.79  0  150.79 
Age   11899  38.22 12.26  16  64 
HGC   11899  12.96 2.70  0  17 
Married, Spouse Present  11899  0.56 0.50  0  1 
Married, Other  11899  0.19 0.39  0  1 
Midwest   11899  0.24 0.43  0  1 
South     11899  0.35 0.48  0  1 
West   11899  0.23 0.42  0  1 
No. of Children in HH  11899  0.72 1.10  0  11 
Definitions:  Log Wage:  natural log of wage, recoded to $1 to $65.63.  Corrected BMI:  BMI adjusted with 
NHANES III coefficient.  Year: (Year-1987)*Corrected BMI interaction variable. Year: (Year-1987). 
Test=dummy for those in cohort ages 16-24 in 1987. Test2: dummy for those in cohort ages 22-30 in 
1987. Test5: dummy for those in cohort ages 16-42 in 1987. Test 5 Young:  dummy for those younger 
than those in test cohort.  Test 5 Old: dummy for those older than those in test cohort.  
Test5Young*Corrected BMI: interaction between test5yng and Corrected BMI.  Test 5 Old * Corrected 
BMI:  interaction between Test 5 Old and BMI. Age: age from 5/3 rounds.  HGC=highest grade completed 
(0-17). Married, Spouse Present.. Married, Other: been married, spouse no longer present. Midwest: 
Dummy for those in Midwest. South: Dummy for those in South. West: dummy for those in West. No. of 
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Table 3: NLSY Results  
  Variable     Coefficient  Std. Err. 
  Corrected BMI  -0.00577**  0.00190 
  Year     0.00940* 0.00446 
  Year*Corrected BMI  -0.00023****  0.00014 
  Ever born    -0.0357***  0.00924 
  Young Kid    -0.00557**  0.00176 
  Children Indicator  -0.00298  0.01926 
  White Collar   0.17435***  0.01200 
  Missing White Collar   0.11728***  0.01470 
  Mother's HGC  -0.00066  0.00338 
  Missing Mother's HGC   0.00829  0.05043 
  Father's HGC   0.00579*  0.00248 
  Missing Father's HGC   0.08362*  0.03976 
  Married, Spouse Present   0.03345*  0.01440 
  Married, Other   0.06894***  0.01824 
  GCPS1 (Intelligence)   0.05670***  0.00871 
  Missing GCPS1  -0.07590*  0.03576 
  HGC     0.05920***  0.00399 
  Missing HGC   0.81294***  0.10592 
  Enrolled in School  -0.12323***  0.01332 
  Years of Work Experience   0.02527***  0.00255 
  Missing Years of Work   0.29621***  0.03532 
  Tenure     0.02608***  0.00182 
  Missing Tenure   0.07869  0.06505 
  Part-Time Work Indicator   0.02653  0.01805 
  Missing Part-Time Work  -0.12348***  0.02394 
  Age   -0.00154 0.00371 
  Low Unemployment   0.06828***  0.00976 
  High Unemployment  -0.00726  0.01122 
  Missing Unemployment  -0.00129  0.03107 
  Northeast   -0.00507  0.02157 
  North Central  -0.13047***  0.01914 
  South   -0.11282***  0.01906 
  Constant     0.96621***   0.09783 
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Table 4: NMES/MEPS Results, Baseline Model 
  Variable     Coefficient  Std. Err. 
 Corrected  BMI  -0.00489**  0.00150 
  Year * Corrected BMI   0.00005  0.00011 
 Year     0.00425  0.00292 
 Age     0.00811***  0.00047 
 HGC     0.09324***  0.00179 
  Married, Spouse Present   0.14882***  0.01315 
  Married, Other   0.10046***  0.01638 
 Midwest   -0.10175***  0.01476 
 South   -0.12187***  0.01386 
 West   -0.04664**  0.01500 
  No. of Children in HH  -0.01528***  0.00458 
 Constant     0.98478***  0.04753 
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Table 5: NMES/MEPS Results, Synthetic Cohort, Ages 22-30 in 1987 
  Variable     Coefficient  Std. Err. 
 Corrected  BMI  -0.00516  0.00307 
  Year * Corrected BMI  -0.00023  0.00023 
 Year     0.00568  0.00683 
 Age     0.01822***  0.00368 
 HGC     0.09084***  0.00363 
  Married, Spouse Present   0.05534*  0.02536 
 Married,  Other  -0.01813  0.03215 
 Midwest   -0.09373**  0.02905 
 South   -0.10691***  0.02739 
 West   -0.06401*  0.02935 
  No. of Children in HH  -0.00602  0.00901 
 Constant     0.84782***  0.13075 


































   29
Table 6: NMES/MEPS Results, Synthetic Cohort, Ages 16-24 in 1987 
  Variable     Coefficient  Std. Err. 
 Corrected  BMI  -0.00178  0.00401 
  Year * Corrected BMI  -0.00057*  0.00028 
 Year   0.03129***  0.00777 
 Age     0.00637  0.00412 
 HGC     0.10105***  0.00404 
  Married, Spouse Present   0.11838***  0.02527 
  Married, Other   0.09030*  0.03517 
 Midwest   -.015436***  0.03077 
 South   -0.17810***  0.02893 
 West   -0.06592*  0.03071 
  No. of Children in HH  -0.02806**  0.00862 
 Constant   0.84596***  0.13707 
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Table 7: NMES/MEPS Results, Synthetic Cohort, Ages 16-42 in 1987 
  Variable     Coefficient  Std. Err. 
 Corrected  BMI  -0.00376*  0.00188 
  Year * Corrected BMI  -0.00028*  0.00014 
 Year     0.01606***  0.00376 
 Age     0.00708***  0.00087 
 HGC     0.09388***  0.00220 
  Married, Spouse Present   0.08514***  0.01682 
  Married, Other   0.05006*  0.02039 
 Midwest   -0.09647***  0.01794 
 South   -0.12574***  0.01691 
 West   -0.05954**  0.01825 
  No. of Children in HH  -0.01735**  0.00549 
 Constant     1.04471***  0.05923 
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Table 8: NMES/MEPS Results, Synthetic Cohort Base, Ages 16-42 in 1987 
  Variable     Coefficient  Std. Err. 
 Corrected  BMI  -0.00439**  0.00169 
  Year * Corrected BMI  -0.00021****  0.00012 
 Year     0.012887***  0.00331 
  Test 5 Young  -0.31515***  0.05335 
  Test 5 Old    -0.15621*  0.06350 
  Test 5 Young * BMI   0.00740***  0.00188 
  Test 5 Old * BMI   0.00347  0.00225 
 Age     0.00735***  0.00077 
 HGC     0.09170***  0.00179 
  Married, Spouse Present   0.12641***  0.01331 
  Married, Other   0.08121***  0.01644 
 Midwest   -0.09841***  0.01471 
 South   -0.11657***  0.01382 
 West   -0.04384**  0.01495 
  No. of Children in HH  -0.01774***  0.00456 
 Constant     1.05418***  0.05242 


























   32
 
Figure 1:  White Females, Overweight/Obese 1981-2000 
Year Overweight Obese  Overweight  +  Obese 
1981 8.6%  4.1%  12.6% 
1982 10.5%  4.7%  15.2% 
1985 14.3%  6.8%  21.1% 
1986 16.5%  8.0%  24.5% 
1988 18.8%  9.3%  28.1% 
1989 19.0%  10.8%  29.7% 
1990 19.5%  11.7%  31.3% 
1992 22.4%  13.7%  36.1% 
1993 22.9%  14.4%  37.2% 
1994 22.2%  17.3%  39.5% 
1996 24.2%  18.6%  42.7% 
1998 24.2%  22.5%  46.8% 
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Figure 2:  NLSY Results 
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Figure 3: NMES/MEPS Results, Synthetic Cohort, Ages 16-24 in 1987 
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Figure 4: NMES/MEPS Results, Synthetic Cohort, Ages 16-42 in 1987 
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Figure 5: NMES/MEPS Results, Synthetic Cohort Base, Ages 16-42 in 1987 
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Figure 6: NMES/MEPS Results, Synthetic Cohort Base, Ages 16-42 in 1987 – 
Simulated Wages 
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